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Abstract 
This article discusses the possibilities and obstacles for a cost-effective implementation of policies that will lead to a 
significant reduction in global CO2 emissions from the use of oil. The structural conditions and economic consequences 
of changing national or regional energy systems vary dramatically. In addition, there are a large number of actors with 
strong interests along the energy value chain that may potentially halt, delay or alter the implementation of the Paris 
treaty. We analyze these issues by first locating oil in the overall energy system, then identifying possibilities and 
obstacles at various stages of the oil value chain, and finally by contextualizing global oil by discussing whether and how 
it may be affected by geopolitics and regional conflict. In brief, our argument is that developments in consumption 
volumes and patterns will be most important. Market forces are vital, but they are influenced by politics and public 
policy outcomes. Transportation is the most important sector for oil consumption, with changes in transport behavior, 
modes and technology being vital drivers. The behavior of investors will be a decisive factor in shaping the production 
side of the oil system. If investments go down as a response to lasting low oil prices and/or because investors decide to 
turn to green economy options, the supply of oil will logically shrink. On the other hand, the growth and development 
aspirations of a rapidly growing population in developing countries are likely to stimulate demand and thus increase 
exploration, production and subsequently the price. Finally, we emphasize the importance of (geo)politics influencing 
all aspects of the value chain of oil. 
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1. Introduction 
The Paris treaty is an impressive achievement in inter-
national diplomacy. Before the conference, a deal 
along the lines of the outcome would have been re-
garded as impossible by most analysts. A total of 195 
countries signed the Paris treaty, and most of them will 
ratify it. As other contributors to this volume demon-
strate, the treaty is not just based on voluntarism. How-
ever, the willingness of signatories and their capacity to 
implement the treaty vary. Still, Paris will affect policy-
making processes, both directly and indirectly: directly in 
terms of putting pressure on governments to honor 
promises of climate warming abatement action and indi-
rectly in the sense that the general public will be more 
inclined to accept changes in energy usage.  
At the same time, the structural conditions and eco-
nomic consequences of changing national or regional 
energy systems vary dramatically. There are a large 
number of actors with strong interests and the capacity 
to exercise both economic and political power along the 
energy value chain. They may potentially halt, delay or 
alter the implementation of the Paris treaty. We analyze 
these issues by first locating oil in the overall energy sys-
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tem, then identifying the possibilities and obstacles at 
various stages of the oil value chain, and finally contex-
tualizing global oil by discussing whether and how it may 
be affected by geopolitics and regional conflict. 
Our argument in brief is that developments in con-
sumption volumes and patterns will be most im-
portant. Market forces are vital, but they are influ-
enced by power, politics and public policy outcomes. 
Transportation is the most important sector for oil con-
sumption; changes in transport behavior, modes and 
technology will therefore be vital drivers. The behavior 
of investors will be a decisive factor in shaping the pro-
duction side of the oil system. If investments go down 
as a response to lasting low oil prices, and/or because 
investors decide to turn to green economy options, 
then the supply of oil will logically shrink. On the other 
hand, the growth and development aspirations of a 
rapidly growing population in developing countries are 
likely to stimulate demand, and thus increase explora-
tion, production and subsequently the price. Finally, 
we emphasize the importance of (geo)politics that are 
influencing all aspects of the value chain of oil. 
2. Oil as Part of the Global Energy System 
The target set by the Paris Agreement, to keep the in-
crease in the average global temperature well below 2 
°C above pre-industrial levels, is demanding. If the tar-
get is to be met, radical changes in the global energy 
system are required. Moreover, key actors also have to 
change their policy with regard to both adaptation and 
mitigation measures.  
In order to evaluate the impact of the Paris Agree-
ment on energy sectors, it is important to acknowledge 
some fundamental features of that system. One such 
feature is that energy sources are not equivalent in all 
respects, nor are their users. Put simply, the idea is 
that we have some primary energy sources that we 
want to turn into various energy services, such as the 
heating of rooms and water, the cooking of food and 
the cooling of beer, locomotion, or lighting. In addition, 
some primary energy sources are used as input factors 
in industrial production. This goes particularly for oil, 
which is a key factor in the production of several thou-
sand consumer products. Between the primary energy 
sources and the energy services, we find what is usual-
ly called secondary energy. In the case of oil, these are 
the various refined petroleum products, such as gaso-
line, diesel and jet fuel. Electricity is another kind of 
secondary energy that is particularly flexible, since it 
can be produced from several of the primary sources 
and used for most of the energy services. The primary 
energy sources are usually categorized as fossil fuels 
(crude oil, natural gas and coal), nuclear fuels (uranium 
and possibly thorium) or renewable energy (water, sun, 
wind, tide, biomass and geothermal energy). 
The distribution of world consumption of primary 
energy in 2013 is shown in Table 1. However, the dis-
tribution of primary energy does not necessarily reflect 
the importance of the various primary sources in the 
end use, or in energy service provision, since the energy 
efficiency and losses of the different primary sources 
varies with the different technologies for transferring 
the primary source into the various energy services.  
Table 1 also includes the scenarios of the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA). These are not to be taken 
as predictions, but rather as descriptions of possible fu-
ture developments. In the Current Policies scenario, on-
ly policies for which implementing measures are for-
mally adopted are included. In the New Policies 
scenario, relative intentions announced are also in-
cluded. This is the central scenario of the IEA. The 450 
Scenario attempts to capture the necessary measures 
in order to limit the rise in global temperature to two 
degrees Celsius (IEA, 2015, pp. 34-35). 
Technological innovations are essential drivers for 
increased efficiency and reduced losses in the whole 
value chain. Technological revolutions do occur, but 
they are hard to foresee and thus not included in any 
of the IEA scenarios in Table 1. In the transportation 
sector, there is ongoing research regarding both the 
vehicles and engines, and the use of various new fuels, 
such as hydrogen. More incremental technology-
improving processes have been taking place for a long 
Table 1. World primary energy consumption in 2013 and IEA scenarios in million tons of oil equivalents (mtoe). Source: 
IEA (2015, p. 57). 
 
 Current Policies New Policies 450 Scenario 
Year 2013 2040 2040 2040 
Coal 3,929 5,618 4,414 2,495 
Oil 4,219 5,348 4,735 3,351 
Gas 2,901 4,610 4,239 3,335 
Nuclear 646 1,036 1,201 1,627 
Hydro 326 507 531 588 
Bioenergy 1,376 1,830 1,878 2,331 
Other renewables 161 693 937 1,470 
Total 13,558 19,642 17,935 15,197 
Fossil fuel share 81% 79% 75% 60% 
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time, e.g. with the combustion engine (Jacobs, 2015). 
The importance of the different primary energy 
sources in the various consumption sectors differs from 
country to country. Although oil constitutes approxi-
mately one-third of primary energy consumption, it is 
not used in all end-user sectors. Table 2 illustrates the 
variation in primary energy consumption for the US, 
China, India and the EU. These four constitute 56% of 
total world energy consumption. 
The fossil fuel share is more than 70% in all four 
countries, although the fossil mix is different, with Chi-
na having two-thirds of its energy consumption met by 
coal, compared to the US and the EU, where this share 
is less than one-fifth. These four actors will be quite 
decisive if the Paris goal of “well below 2 °C” is to be 
achieved. Their Indicated Nationally Determined Con-
tributions (INDCs) vary considerably, with the EU’s 
binding target of an at least 40% domestic reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 
being by far the most ambitious. China aims to achieve 
the peaking of carbon dioxide emissions by around 
2030, and to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in 
primary energy consumption to approximately 20% 
(versus 12% in 2013). The US’ commitment is a 17% re-
duction by 2020 (from the 2005 level of emissions) and 
to explore possible accelerated reductions further on, 
whereas India has committed itself to a 20–25% reduc-
tion over the same period. These policy positions com-
bined are not going to result in implementing the “well 
below 2 °C” target. The procedure of setting more am-
bitious targets every five years, and developing a 
transparent and accountable system to follow up Paris 
and the five-year revisions, is therefore crucial. 
3. Oil Consumption by Sector 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of global oil consump-
tion by end-use sectors in 2014 and the IEA’s central 
scenario for 2040. According to the so-called New Poli-
cies scenario, three-fourths of oil consumption in 2040 
will be used for transportation and petrochemicals. 
Hence, our discussion will focus on some of the possi-
bilities and obstacles for change in these two sectors. 
Table 2. Primary energy consumption in 2013 (mtoe and percentage). Source: IEA (2015, annex). 
 US EU China India 
 mtoe % mtoe % mtoe % mtoe % 
Coal 432 19.8 286 17.6 2,053 67.6 341 44.0 
Oil 782 35.8 513 31.6 483 15.9 176 22.7 
Gas 610 27.9 387 23.8 142 4.7 45 5.8 
Nuclear 214 9.8 229 14.1 29 1.0 9 1.2 
Hydro 23 1.1 32 2.0 78 2.6 12 1.5 
Bioenergy 97 4.4 140 8.6 216 7.1 188 24.3 
Other Renewables 26 1.2 37 2.3 37 1.2 4 0.5 
Total 2,184 100.0 1,624 100.0 3,038 100.0 775 100.0 
Share of world total 16.1 12.0 22.4 5.7 
 
Figure 1. Global oil consumption by sector, 2014 and 2040 (New Policies scenario), million barrels per day. Source: IEA 
(2015, p. 121). Note: * Includes agriculture, transformation and other non-energy use (primarily bitumen and lubricants). 
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One obvious option is to disconnect emissions from 
use, in other words to capture the carbon before being 
released into the atmosphere (Carbon Capture and 
Storage—CCS). Although this can be important for in-
dustrial oil use, applying CCS technology to mobile 
emission sources seems unrealistic today. The atten-
tion of CCS has been more prominent in power genera-
tion than in the industry sector, due to the fact that re-
ducing power generation from coal and natural gas 
could be one of the most important ways of reaching 
global emission targets, while the oil-based industry is 
less prominent. Oil has almost been phased out as a 
source for power generation (cf. Figure 1). Thus, CCS in 
power generation will in itself hardly affect the global 
oil market. However, successful CCS in power genera-
tion could even influence the industrial sector, and 
therefore also the oil market. Thus far, the costs of CCS 
have prohibited large-scale introduction in both power 
generation and the industrial sector.  
A second option, both in transport and industry, is 
to improve the efficiency of installations, production 
plants and vehicle engines. As mentioned above, oil is 
part of the production of goods used in the industry 
sectors itself, in building materials and in thousands of 
consumer products. These many products are made by 
the application of a number of different technologies 
and production processes. It follows that “a piecewise 
approach to reducing emissions is required, which is 
challenging to monitor, incentivize and control” 
(Brown, Gambhir, Florin, & Fennel, 2012, p. 1). Fur-
thermore, the current industrial technological standard 
varies immensely across countries and regions. As a re-
sult, technology transfer will both increase efficiency 
and reduce emissions. Nonetheless, improved energy 
efficiency can have unintended consequences regard-
ing consumption. If buying a more fuel-efficient car 
leads to increased driving, the positive effect on emis-
sions is reduced (Sorrell, 2007). This is further compli-
cated in the transportation sector, since there is no lin-
ear relationship between high income and reduced 
emission. With a high income, two effects follow: a 
larger car, with a more gasoline consuming engine, and 
more cars in the same household. These effects can 
nullify the effect of technological improvements in the 
car engines themselves.  
A third possible strategy is to switch from fossil 
fuels to renewables. In the industrial sector, this will be 
a matter of costs and profit margins. In most cases, 
changing fuel in existing industrial plants seems to be 
prohibitively costly, at least without government subsi-
dies. Building new plants with non-fossil input will de-
pend on investments in new technology, but without 
any subsidies such investments will have to pay off in 
companies’ balance sheets within a reasonable time 
frame. In the transport sector, there are major chal-
lenges to accomplish a total fuel switch. The most 
readily available alternative at the end-user stage is to 
switch from a fossil fuel car to an electric car. The US 
National Academy of Sciences discusses this issue in a 
large-scale report entitled, Hidden Costs of Energy. 
They balance the externalities of a reduction in urban 
emissions, safety issues and the environmental aspects 
related to battery recycling and disposal. They find that 
the positive impact of fuel switching in the consump-
tion stage of the value chain depends on the type of 
primary energy fed into the electricity production. If 
coal is used to generate the electricity used in electric 
vehicles, the emission reduction from replacing the in-
ternal combustion engine with the electric engine is 
reduced and possibly lost, also if considering the effi-
ciency gains in the engine: “when the damages at-
tributable to other parts of the life cycle were included, 
especially the emissions from the feedstock and the 
fuel (emissions from electricity production), the aggre-
gate damages for the grid-dependent and all-electric 
vehicles became comparable to, or somewhat higher 
than, those from gasoline” (NAS, 2013, p. 202). The net 
benefit of the electric car is a highly controversial issue, 
and solving it is far beyond the scope of this article. 
Finally, the underlying trends in demand will also 
influence the possibility of reducing overall global oil 
consumption. For the industry sector, the IEA finds 
that, “Despite the growth in total demand, the oil in-
tensity of GDP (i.e. the amount of oil used per unit of 
economic value) continues to decline….The industry sec-
tor, the second-largest contributor to global GDP and 
the second-largest oil consumer (when including petro-
chemical feed stocks), uses 30% less oil per unit of value 
added [than one and a half decade ago].” This effect is 
slower in the industry sector than in the service sectors 
because “soaring demand for plastic products in devel-
oping economies more than offset further improve-
ments and saturation effects in the industrialized coun-
tries” (IEA, 2015, p 120). In the transportation sector, a 
number of factors will influence the future demand for 
the various fuels. Although the average fuel consump-
tion, and thus emissions, of new passenger cars is likely 
to continue to fall, consumer choices may offset the ef-
fect on total emissions as the number of cars increases 
(cf. Figure 2). Also note that in 2005 the number of new 
cars sold in China was 33% of the number sold in the US, 
and that by 2015 the same ratio had increased to 140%. 
The number of vehicles in use in 2014 was 808 per 1,000 
inhabitants in the US, 569 in the EU, 102 in China and 
only 22 per 1,000 inhabitants in India (OICA, 2015). From 
2013 to 2014, the share of electric vehicles grew from 
1.3% to 1.5% in the US, and from 0.1% to 0.3% in China. 
We predict that the car industry will move strongly into 
non-fossil car production over the coming decades, and 
that both electricity and hydrogen will represent com-
petitive alternatives to fossil fuel cars. 
The hardest obstacle to achieving a reduced global 
consumption of fossil fuels is the fact that for several 
decades many hundreds of millions of people will in-
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crease their energy consumption. Table 1 suggests an 
increase in the use of all types of primary energy 
sources, although renewables represent the strongest 
growth. It nevertheless leads to a fossil fuel share in 
the global energy mix in 2040, even in the best climate 
scenario, of 60%. 
Within these global trends, there are important ge-
ographical differences that reflect variations in the lev-
el of industrialization and economic development. 
Countries and regions that are relatively industrialized 
and economically developed will reduce oil demand, 
whereas those which are still relatively less industrial-
ized, and with populations aspiring to economic devel-
opment, will likely increase their demand for oil (Figure 
3). The Paris treaty takes unequal levels of develop-
ment into account by not committing developing, in 
particular the least developed, countries to combatting 
GHG emissions to the extent that developed countries 
are committed. Implementation of the agreement will 
“reflect equity and the principle of common but differ-
entiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” 
(Agreement art. 2). A major political issue in the years 
ahead will therefore be how to balance global goals for 
combatting GHG with national aspirations for econom-
ic development. In this issue area, China and not least 
India, with its combination of demographic growth and 
high economic growth potential, will be key actors. For 
both these countries, however, the vital factor in de-
termining their follow-up of Paris is their consumption 
of coal (see Table 2). There is a considerable amount of 
potential for energy conservation in the carbon sector 
in China, but it is very much dependent on an increased 
investment in innovating and developing new technol-
ogy (Boqiang & Xuan, 2015). 
 
Figure 2. Registration or sales of new vehicles 2005–2015. Source: OICA (2015). 
 
Figure 3. Change in oil demand in selected countries and regions in the New Policies scenario, 2014–2040. Source: IEA 
(2015, p. 467). 
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There are billions of oil consumers making individu-
al decisions and calculations every day with implica-
tions for global oil consumption. The implementation 
of the Paris Agreement will have to put in place various 
incentives, restrictions, regulations and legislation all 
over the world for these individuals to reduce their oil 
consumption. A large number of the oil-consuming in-
dividuals live in countries that provide them with a sig-
nificant degree of freedom regarding their choices of 
energy consumption. In these cases, changes are best 
induced through mild incentives or changes in attitudes 
toward oil consumption at the societal-, and not least 
the local level.  
4. Counterforces: Producer Reactions 
The structure on the producer side of the market is dif-
ferent from that on the consumer side. Compared to 
the billions of individual oil consumers, the top 10 pro-
ducing countries cover two-thirds of the market (cf. Ta-
ble 3), which obviously represents considerable power. 
All of the top 10 producers, with the exception of 
the US, have a strong state involvement and control 
over their oil industry, and thus all decisions related to 
oil production, and subsequently the market-related re-
actions to the implementation of the Paris Agreement. 
Although there are important differences between Can-
ada, Saudi Arabia and China regarding governmental 
control, we argue that the economic aspects relevant for 
analyzing their reaction to Paris will be fairly similar.  
Most of the largest oil producers were against any 
type of international climate agreement, simply because 
it increases the likelihood of a reduced consumption of 
oil. Some producer countries were more active in their 
opposition to the Paris treaty than others, with reports 
suggesting that Saudi Arabia was particularly active.  
We will not discuss these aspects further here, in-
stead focusing on the options available to oil-producing 
countries in the face of an increased potential for non-
trivial negative effects on oil consumption following 
from the Paris conference. The conclusion of the previ-
ous section was that such effects are hard to identify in 
the short run, but they might be more likely in the long-
er run. It should also be noted that the Paris Agreement 
can create significant emission reductions without hav-
ing a strong impact on the oil sector, for instance if the 
global coal consumption is reduced considerably. 
Even so, it is fair to expect some kind of strategic 
reaction from oil producers, based on the fact that the 
Paris Agreement has created a new type of uncertainty 
for their long-term reliance on income from oil exports. 
Saudi Arabia’s intention to diversify into financial oper-
ations is an illustration, though probably a non-typical 
one given the country’s extraordinarily strong position 
as the world’s largest oil exporter. When it comes to op-
tions related to the market and the oil industry of pro-
ducing countries, we see three possible strategies to 
meet reduced demand induced by the Paris Agreement: 
Competitive strategy: In this case, the oil producers 
meet the competition from other energy sources by 
reducing the price of oil. On average, the production 
costs in countries like Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf 
states are less than 10 US dollars per barrel. More im-
portant in the oil industry is the so-called replacement 
cost (the cost of replacing a consumed barrel with a 
new barrel), which represents the long-term costs of 
sustaining current production levels. The figure has 
been falling every year over the last three decades, but 
with some exceptions. The technical and industrial po-
tential for a long-term/low-price strategy is present. 
However, to what extent it is economically and politi-
cally viable is less obvious, and if the alternative is to 
be out of business, several key producers might find 
this strategy attractive. With moderate investments, 
several of the producers around the Persian Gulf can 
increase their production capacity (OPEC, 2015).  
Capitulation strategy: Models of resource econom-
ics suggest that oil-producing countries do not operate 
according to principles of market economics, but in-
stead try to gain as much rent from their respective oil 
wealth as possible (Dasgupta & Heal, 1979; Hotelling, 
1931). If the expectation is that the consumers will turn 
away from oil in the long term, it could make sense to 
try to gain as much money as possible from the oil re-
serves, as soon as possible. This would imply immedi-
ately dumping as much oil as possible on the market. 
Table 3. Top 10 oil producers. Source: BP (2015) and World Bank (2016a). 
Country Share of world production (2014) Oil share of GDP (2014) 
US 13.1 0.8 
Saudi Arabia 13.0 38.7 
Russia 12.2 12.7 
Canada 4.8 3.4 
China 4.8 0.9 
UAE 4.2 19.0 
Iran 4.1 23.6 
Iraq 3.7 41.4 
Kuwait 3.5 57.7 
Mexico 3.1 6.8 
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This would obviously bring the price down, so it is not 
entirely distinct from their competitive strategy, but it 
can be identified by the oil producers, thereby maxim-
izing their production according to their installed pro-
duction capacity and, if possible, to increase their pro-
duction capacity even further. 
Change-over strategy: This strategy moves us away 
from the pure market operations, and focuses on al-
ternative courses of action in order to sustain current 
economic welfare levels. Several of the Middle East oil 
producers have pursued such a strategy for decades, 
though with little success. It is very difficult to turn re-
sources and investments away from an extremely lu-
crative industry, such as oil production in the Middle 
East, into necessarily less lucrative sectors. A fall in oil 
prices might help such a strategy. Another aspect 
emerging is that some of these countries have natural 
conditions for alternative energy production, first and 
foremost solar power. It would obviously not be possi-
ble to replace the income from oil in the short run. But 
it is possible to imagine a breaking point, in which the 
long-term value of solar power, investment costs in-
cluded, outweigh a losing battle to sustain world oil 
demand by cutting oil prices. 
The three strategies are not that distinct from each 
other, but they can be empirically identified by investi-
gating market behavior, production level and capacity 
change, as well as investments in alternative industries. 
Still, these factors can change even without any refer-
ence to the Paris treaty or climate change in general. 
Since 2014, the market behavior of the leading pro-
ducer country, Saudi Arabia, has seemingly changed 
dramatically, from sustaining a high price to instigating 
a price war against high-cost producers outside of 
OPEC. On closer inspection, however, the Saudi Arabi-
an policy is not new. It is in line with the behavior of 
the Kingdom in 1985–86, when the attempt to sustain 
the high prices created in the 1970s by cutting produc-
tion failed. It then flooded the market in order to drive 
high-costs producers out of business. The high price of 
oil from 2008 to 2014, combined with technological 
breakthroughs in the production of so-called shale oil, 
has attracted new producers, in particular in the Unit-
ed States. The market became oversupplied, and the 
price started dropping in the autumn of 2014. This time 
Saudi Arabia did not cut its own production, but in-
stead increased it in order to reduce the profitability 
for all high-cost producers.  
The immediate motivation behind this strategy is 
not directly linked to climate change or the Paris trea-
ty. Even so, the ambition for oil producers with large 
resource bases to prolong the horizon of the oil age 
can influence the likelihood and costs of replacing the 
consumption of fossil fuels with renewables. An oil 
price above $100 per barrel would make it much easier 
for renewables to compete than with an oil price below 
$50 per barrel. The available resources that can be 
produced profitably at $20 per barrel over the next 
decades are almost infinite.  
For some of the key oil exporters, the income from 
oil exports is crucial for their economic activity in gen-
eral, and thus for the welfare level of their societies (cf. 
Table 4). In addition, some of these countries are so-
called rentier states (Luciani, 1990; Noreng, 2004), in-
dicating that the state is economically independent of 
its inhabitants as it supports itself from oil income. In 
such cases, a reduction in oil income jeopardizes the 
political leadership. For instance, the Saudi Arabian re-
gime appears to be dependent on distributing parts of 
its oil income among a population that is widely unem-
ployed (Cappelen & Choudhury, 2004). At the same 
time, it has a huge potential for defending its position, 
illustrated by its announcement to register ARAMCO, 
the state oil company, and by far the biggest producer 
in the world, at the Riyadh stock exchange. Selling a 
mere 5% of the company will raise $250 billion and 
support state finances currently running a budget defi-
cit. In other words, the Kingdom disposes of a huge re-
serve of not only oil, but also financial resources that 
could make it not only invulnerable to financial prob-
lems, but also diversify its economy and make it less 
dependent on oil income in the future.  
Table 4. Top 10 crude oil exporters. Source: World Bank (2016b). 
Country Oil exports (mb/d) Share of total exports (%) 
Saudi Arabia 6,250 76 
Russia 4,871 68 
Canada 2,470 19 
Iran 2,297 54 
United Arab Emirates 2,181 28 
Nigeria 2,115 92 
Angola 1,909 90 
Iraq 1,903 99 
Venezuela 1,594 96 
Kuwait 1,495 94 
 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 197-208 204 
5. Pursue Paris or Protect Profits? Investor and 
Company Reactions 
Investor decisions are a crucial factor in shaping the ef-
fects of Paris. Private investment decisions are also 
crucial to the prospect of sustained oil production in 
most producer countries, with the possible exception 
of several key producers in the Middle East. While the 
rig count of Saudi Arabia increased 15% from 2014 to 
2015, it was almost cut in half in the US (OPEC, 2016, p. 
91). If investments in the oil industry were to dry up, 
the industry would also contract. At the moment 
(Spring, 2016), the price of oil is naturally a focal point 
for investors. With low prices, the time horizon will 
have to be extended in order to handle risk and gain 
lifetime profits from the individual field investments. 
Nonetheless, we argue that price developments are 
not the only factor to consider when the future behav-
ior of investors and companies is analyzed.  
Contrary to the oil producers themselves, the inves-
tor can rapidly change from oil to other assets. The role 
of investors, whether they sit inside the producing 
companies, provide capital to finance those companies 
or the oil services companies, or whether they consider 
investing in transportation modes, has an effect at all 
stages of the oil value chain. In many countries, oil 
production is a capital-intensive business. Therefore, a 
crucial variable in the premises forming investor deci-
sions is what long-term strategies they adopt, among 
other things what time horizon they apply for their 
profit target and what risk they are prepared to take. 
The coal industry is already subject to substantial disin-
vestment. Moreover, several individual investors, as 
well as corporate managements, have signaled that 
they will invest in the transformation to a green econ-
omy. However, the standard assumption is that most 
investors still respond primarily to market forces, and 
their own profit aspirations and risk assessments ra-
ther than to Paris. Will this change, and thus give Paris 
a significant impact on investors’ behavior? 
Current trends could be a signal. At the current 
price level ($40 per barrel), producer companies lose 
money on drilling for oil in the United States and most, 
if not all, offshore global locations. They “are slashing 
jobs, costs and capital spending in order to maintain 
promised dividend payouts. But the lower prices go, 
the more they borrow to honour those pledges” (The 
Economist, 2016b). The 400 largest oil service compa-
nies have slashed 250,000 jobs since 2014 (Ånestad & 
Haug, 2016). Several of the major Western companies 
piled up debt in 2015, and some have been downgrad-
ed by the rating agency, Standard & Poor’s. An increas-
ing share of corporate bonds is trading on negative 
yields, and investors are losing money. The proportion 
of junk bonds deemed to be distressed more than 
doubled from early 2015 to 2016, with the oil and gas 
sector accounting for the biggest share of issuers in dis-
tress, at 30% of the total (The Economist, 2016a). Alt-
hough the default rate is still below the historical aver-
age, it doubled from the low of 2014, and will likely 
continue to rise if the price of oil does not.  
The downward trend is also reflected in invest-
ments. Hence, global investments in oil fell from $920 
billion in 2014 to an estimated $620 billion in 2016. At 
the same time, investments in green energy have been 
larger for the last four years than in the entire carbon 
sector. Green investments have increased six-fold from 
2004 to 2015 (Mathismoen, 2016). Consequently, 
there is a possibility that investors will decide to move 
out of all fossil fuels, and not only coal. These trends 
are clear signals, but should at this point still be seen as 
indications of change, and not proof that an irreversi-
ble change has started. It is, however, a clear indication 
of change that the one-third drop in investments start-
ed before Paris. On the other hand, the past is a story 
of very volatile oil prices; and some investors may bet 
on that pattern repeating itself. A good number of 
them are expecting price increases in the months or 
years to come; they may rely on the consultancy firm 
Rystad Energy, which predicts a price rise to above 
$100 by 2020 (Melberg, 2016). Some of them may 
even decide to invest in exploration, but maintain the 
option to withdraw the investment later if the success 
of operations looks unpromising.1 
The Western majors, the International Oil Compa-
nies (IOCs) that ruled the oil industry for several dec-
ades, are no longer in a position to do so. Since the 
1970s, they have lost control over primary oil produc-
tion and reserves, and they have also lost some of their 
control over oil technology to service companies. Their 
response has been to diversify, notably into gas, there-
by merging and maximizing shareholder value. Gas, 
however, is a competitive market, in which the IOCs 
are neither dominant nor necessarily the most compet-
itive. And as we demonstrated above, shareholders 
appear to be becoming as concerned about current 
cash flow problems and increasing debt as they are 
about making new investments. As Paul Stevens ar-
gues, the whole business model of the IOCs is faltering; 
as they have adapted too late to the changing technol-
ogy and geopolitical shifts (Stevens, 2016). At the same 
time, we submit that the IOCs, perhaps because they 
are struggling to maintain their global position and 
their business model, may attempt to compensate for 
their losing power at the international level by exercis-
ing pressure and power at the domestic level. This ap-
pears to apply in particular to the US, where the presi-
dent’s policy decisions may be blocked by Congress. If 
the IOCs want to block Paris, this is arguably their best 
chance of doing so. Having said this, we also observe 
that some of the IOCs like Shell have set a strategy that 
                                                          
1 For a modelling of this and alternative decision-making op-
tions, see Begg, Bratvold and Campbell (2002). 
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implies that they plan to take part in the greening of 
the energy system. 
6. Contextualizing the Issue: Geopolitics or Paris? 
Periodically, political, in particular geopolitical factors, 
have had a strong influence on the price of oil (Faven-
nec, 2007; Painter, 2014). Major wars or political revo-
lutions in major producer countries almost automati-
cally lead to greatly increased oil prices, while a 
peaceful resolution to a major conflict lowers prices. 
Abrupt changes in political regimes also have a proven 
effect on prices. Security, including energy security, has 
traditionally been and will continue to be a serious 
concern for governments. These factors have either 
trumped market factors to set them aside, or they have 
boosted them. In both cases, the result has been up-
wards or downwards price fluctuations (cf. Figure 4), 
and there is nothing to indicate that these factors will 
have less importance in the future. 
Predicting geopolitics and its effects is almost as dif-
ficult as predicting the price of oil—of which geopoliti-
cal events are also major drivers. Together with the re-
integration of Iran in the oil market after the nuclear 
deal, the current conflict between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran has led to an increased supply. Due to the geopo-
litical interests of Saudi Arabia overriding the economic 
interests of re-establishing the producer alliance, the 
Doha meeting in mid-April 2016 ended without an 
OPEC agreement to regulate volume (Raval, Sheppard, 
& Hume, 2016). Changes in the regional security com-
plex of the Middle East, and more specifically the Per-
sian Gulf, will continue to influence the market behav-
ior of the oil suppliers inside the region. It will also 
continue to be an important factor in the foreign policy 
of the superpowers. The evolution of the relationship 
between the United States and China will likely affect 
the demand for oil; if they stay relatively cooperative 
they will not drive demand, but if they were to turn 
towards more conflict, for instance over East Asian se-
curity issues, these powers are likely to increase efforts 
to guarantee their own energy security. National secu-
rity may trump international compliance to climate pol-
icy, and Realism trumps Institutionalism. 
This may result in various types of policy, ranging 
from measures at home to action at the international 
level. Increased self-sufficiency in primary energy 
would imply measures such as an increased stocking of 
supplies and less emphasis on the cost of production at 
home. It may also mean diversifying energy usage and 
supply channels, including foreign ones and to try and 
obtain better control of them (Tunsjø, 2013). The ma-
jor powers will even attempt to control exogenous 
supplies to their geopolitical competitor(s) by influenc-
ing their suppliers, control transportation lines or by 
other means. An increased emphasis on energy securi-
ty may also imply that nuclear power as a primary en-
ergy source may become reinstated. 
History offers several examples of the rationing of 
secondary energy usage being introduced during peri-
ods of war or major international conflicts, with the 
purpose of diverting energy usage from civilian to mili-
tary-related applications. Such motives might still be 
important, but the most likely net effect of increased 
geopolitical conflicts is to halt or stop GHG measures 
following from the Paris treaty. The countries likely to 
be involved in geopolitical games are also the major oil 
consumers and/or producers. 
 
Figure 4. Oil price ($2014 per barrel) and political events. Source: BP (2015). 
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7. Summary and Conclusion 
The Paris treaty is a major political and institutional 
achievement. However, its effect on the global oil sys-
tem is uncertain and complex. The casual chain leading 
from Paris to the end of oil is long, and subject to a 
number of intervening factors. Even if consumers and 
investors also push for de-carbonization regarding oil, 
producer countries and the oil industry might contra-
dict such efforts. How strong and how general the Paris 
effect will be on oil is therefore extremely difficult if 
not impossible to predict.  
This article has discussed several factors that may 
impact on the outcome, some in support of the Paris 
agreement and others working against it, and yet oth-
ers with an uncertain or neutral effect. The agree-
ment’s key principle of burden-sharing, that countries 
have a Common But Differentiated Responsibility 
(CBDR), offers flexibility in implementation and there-
fore also uncertainty regarding the end result. With 
this complexity and variety in mind, we presented sce-
narios for how Paris might affect different parts of the 
global oil system:  
 Without a substantial effect on the global con-
sumption of fossil fuels (oil, gas and coal), the Par-
is treaty will be a failure. Oil is probably the hard-
est to eliminate since the technological 
alternatives in the transportation sector have not 
been fully developed thus far. De-carbonizing oil 
consumption implies not only a switch of power 
source from oil to hydrogen or electricity, but also 
new motors, cars, ships, airplanes and new infra-
structure in most parts of the transportation sec-
tor. Such changes might be both induced and re-
duced by the interests and attitudes of the 
world’s billions of energy consumers. It may obvi-
ously also be influenced by powerful commercial 
actors. In democratic countries, the attitude of 
the electorate will strongly influence the pattern 
and speed of change. On the international politi-
cal scene, individual countries are reluctant to 
move ahead of other countries in introducing 
costly taxation or climate programs, for fear of 
losing competitiveness. In certain cases, domestic 
public opinion can override such fear. Rich coun-
tries are in a better position to take on risky cli-
mate policies than poor countries, and democrat-
ic consuming countries are more likely to 
experience such a domestic pressure than auto-
cratic regimes, although it should be mentioned 
that recent changes in the Chinese energy policy 
are assumed to be the result of strong public op-
position to local environmental degradation from, 
inter alia, coal-fired power plants. 
 We emphasize the role of investors. Their behav-
ior is an early warning of the future, an economi-
cally viable course, and that the energy transition 
may follow. Investments are essentially an at-
tempt to spend money today in order to earn 
money tomorrow. If the de-carbonization of the 
energy system is becoming profitable, we should 
expect to see a move in investments from fossil 
fuels to renewables, including in technologies, 
production, infrastructure, end-user facilities and 
so on. Decisions by risk-aversive investors outside 
of the oil industry increasingly follow the latter, 
and have a large overall effect on the industry. In 
the most likely variant of this scenario, investors 
continue to move out of oil in the expectation of 
continued uncertainty about future profitability. 
In the case of oil, such an observation is distorted 
today as investors are moving away from oil, but 
most likely due to the relative low oil price that 
emerged in 2015.  
 The most compelling counteracting factor in this 
picture is the response to changes in consumption 
by the key oil producers. We developed three 
possible producer strategies with the following 
implications: producers with low costs of produc-
tion follow a competitive or capitulation strategy, 
while facing the prospect of continued prices be-
low profitability, many of those producing at 
higher costs will pursue the change-over strategy.  
 We also see politics as an intervening factor 
among the producers. Geopolitically motivated 
competition and rivalry, as well as radical political 
regime changes, create periodic price changes. 
Historically, they have mostly resulted in price in-
creases that induce rival producers and investors 
to remain in oil. In the case of the current geopo-
litical competition in the Middle East between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, the result is an increase in 
volume that has led to a price drop. Unfortunate-
ly, this has resulted in a price drop that, at least 
from a climate emissions point of view, makes oil 
more competitive for energy consumers. 
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